

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN TELEPOUCH

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

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GROUP 1
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[Redacted]

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DIST 18 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

[Redacted]

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SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE
DURING NOVEMBER 1967

ACQ [Redacted]

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SOURCE [Redacted]

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SUMMARY. THE INCREASED LEVEL OF VIET CONG /VC/ MILITARY AND
TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE WHICH WAS NOTED LAST
MONTH CONTINUED IN NOVEMBER. A PROVINCE-LEVEL MEETING OF VC
CADRES AND MILITARY LEADERS WAS HELD, BUT NO RELIABLE INFORMA-
TION IS YET AVAILABLE CONCERNING THE MEETING. VC PROPAGANDA HAS
SPREAD EXAGGERATED OR COMPLETELY FALSE REPORTS OF LARGE NEW VC
MILITARY UNITS MOVING INTO KHANH HOA IN AN EFFORT TO DEMORALIZE

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PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PERSONNEL. THE PRINCIPAL VC PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO BE INADEQUATE LOCAL RECRUITMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PERSONNEL AND AN INADEQUATE FOOD SUPPLY. END SUMMARY.

POLICY

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[Redacted]

THE VIET CONG /VC/ KHANH HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE HELD A MEETING IN THE LATTER PART OF NOVEMBER, ATTENDED BY CADRES AND MILITARY UNIT COMMANDERS FROM ALL SECTIONS OF THE PROVINCE. IT WAS VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS A REGULAR PROVINCE COMMITTEE MEETING, A SPECIAL MEETING TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS AND POLICY, AND A COMBINATION OF BOTH. [Redacted] THE

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MEETING WAS CALLED TO RESOLVE SERIOUS CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE VC AND REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY /NVA/ UNITS. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

2. THE VC IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE HAVE ADOPTED A NEW

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PROPAGANDA TACTIC, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

THAT BATTALION- AND REGIMENT-SIZE UNITS WERE REINFORCING

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PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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THE KHANH HOA VC FORCES. THE PROPAGANDA STRESSED A NEW UNITED THEME AND ADVISED VILLAGERS TO DIG TRENCHES FOR PROTECTION DURING FUTURE BATTLES. COMBINED WITH INCREASED VC ACTIVITY OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THE PROPAGANDA WAS CONVINCING. NO NEW VC UNIT, HOWEVER, HAS YET BEEN IDENTIFIED IN KHANH HOA. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] THE PRESENCE OF ONE INFILTRATION GROUP OF ABOUT TWO HUNDRED MEN WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS FOR EXISTING UNITS. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] THE VC HAVE SPREAD THIS PROPAGANDA TO DEMORALIZE GVN FORCES, PARTICULARLY REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES, WHILE THE VC CONDUCT THEIR AUTUMN-WINTER CAMPAIGN. OPERATIONS

3. THE INCREASED AMOUNT OF VC MILITARY ACTIVITY NOTED LAST MONTH CONTINUED IN NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS MORE CLEARLY ASSOCIATED WITH FOOD AND SUPPLY SHORTAGES. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF A COORDINATED VC ATTACK ON TWO VILLAGES IN DIEN KHANH DISTRICT /INVOLVING SOME 500 MEN/ WAS THE COLLECTION OF RICE. [Redacted]

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THE VC COLLECTED ALL AVAILABLE RICE. HALF OF THEIR FORCES THEN WITHDREW TO THE MOUNTAINS WITH THE RICE WHILE THE OTHERS COVERED

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PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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THEIR RETREAT. THIS OPERATION COST THE VC 60 KILLED AND 18 CAPTURED.

4. ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS CONTINUED WITH FOUR VC ATTEMPTS TO MINE TRAINS. ONLY TWO WERE SUCCESSFUL. TWO BRIDGES ON HIGHWAY ONE AND ANOTHER ON HIGHWAY 21 WERE DAMAGED BY MINES. THERE WAS ONE SNIPING INCIDENT AND ONE MINE WAS DETONATED BY A VEHICLE ON HIGHWAY ONE. ON 28 NOVEMBER THE VC CLOSED THE ROAD TEMPORARILY FOR MILITARY SECURITY REASONS.

5. EXTENSIVE TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN NHA TRANG CONTINUED FOR THE FOURTH MONTH. EIGHT MINES OR EXPLOSIVE CHARGES WERE DETONATED WITHIN THE CITY, ALTHOUGH ONLY ONE CAUSED SERIOUS CASUALTIES. IN ADDITION, THE NHA TRANG AIRFIELD WAS MORTARED ON 26 NOVEMBER AND A SHIP IN THE HARBOR WAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY A MINE ON 3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2) 3 NOVEMBER. TWO PERSONS [Redacted]

[Redacted] WERE OFFERED MONEY, IN ONE CASE VN\$70,000 /US\$593.22/, TO PLANT EXPLOSIVES AT U.S. OR GVN INSTALLATIONS.

[Redacted]

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THE VC NHA TRANG CITY

COMMITTEE HELD A MEETING ON 17 NOVEMBER TO EVALUATE SABOTAGE

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PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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ACTIVITIES AND TO DRAFT PLANS FOR INCREASING SAPPER UNITS AND FOR RECRUITING VIETNAMESE LABORERS ON U. S. BASES FOR SABOTAGE MISSIONS. [Redacted] COMMENT-- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS MEETING IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE MEETING DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH ONE./

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6. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO ELIMINATE THE VC TAX COLLECTION POINT ON HIGHWAY 21. [Redacted] AN RF COMPANY SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING SURVEILLANCE OF A SIX-MAN VC UNIT AT THE CHECKPOINT, BUT NO CONTACT WAS INITIATED IN THE HOPE OF EVENTUALLY TRAPPING A LARGER GROUP OF VC. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] ESTIMATED THAT THE VC OBTAINED ENOUGH MONEY, FOOD AND SUPPLIES THROUGH THIS CHECKPOINT TO SUPPORT A BATTALION.

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PROBLEMS

7. THE MAIN VC PROBLEMS IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE CONTINUE TO BE PERSONNEL AND FOOD. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] VC RECRUITMENT IN KHANH HOA IS INADEQUATE. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] THE VC REPLACE MILITARY CASUALTIES WITH NVA PERSONNEL OR REINFORCEMENTS FROM OTHER

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PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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PROVINCES. HOWEVER, THE VC DO NOT APPEAR SUCCESSFUL IN REPLACING
 CADRE LOSSES, AND [Redacted] SERIOUS CADRE SHORTAGES AT 3.3(h)(2)
 DISTRICT LEVELS. THE VC APPEAR TO BE CONCENTRATING, WITH SOME
 SUCCESS, ON MAINTAINING ADEQUATE STAFFS IN THE MOST IMPORTANT
 DISTRICTS- HOWEVER, IN AT LEAST THREE OF THE EIGHT DISTRICTS,
 MANY SECTIONS OF THE DISTRICT COMMITTEES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT
 PERSONNEL. ALL SECTIONS OF THE PROVINCE COMMITTEE APPEAR TO BE
 COMPLETELY STAFFED. [Redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] THE VC HAVE ATTEMPTED TO RECRUIT PERSONNEL FOR THE VC
 INFRASTRUCTURE FROM AMONG FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS AND DELINQUENT VC
 MEMBERS.

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